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1 Whether they stand on their own, or are part of a longer routine1, one-liners, or “short
jokes”, have a self-contained quality: they can be considered as a unit, and they are
supposed to produce an immediate comic effect. They could be considered to be the
condensed version of  a  joke,  but  a  difference can be made between one-liners  and
(longer) jokes: because of their very brevity, there is little or no room for elaboration in
one-liners, whereas jokes could be thought to constitute short comic narratives. In this
paper, we would like to discuss one-liners from the perspective of linguistics, focusing
on one approach in particular: we would like to examine the kind of insight one-liners
can provide on how meaning emerges contextually. If an interpretation, arguably the
same for  every  listener,  is  thought  to  have  to  be  computed very  quickly  and then
perhaps changed, they may allow one to discuss the reality and nature of potential
“default” interpretations. As one-liners are short and (apparently) self-contained, the
input of the context may also seem to be limited, so that the way in which a given
interpretation is supposed to emerge has to be clarified. Their comedic value should
not  entirely  be  ignored  either,  since,  as we  will  see,  the  connection  between
interpretative problems and comedic value may not be entirely straightforward.
2 In order to discuss these questions, we will first propose a typology of one-liners in
which we will describe some of the recurrent devices used in this comic form, and
discuss some aspects of their classification; then we will come back synthetically on
what the examples can reveal about “interpretation” processes. Finally, we will briefly
discuss the question of one-liners as a comedic genre, and initiate a discussion of how
form and function interact.
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1. A typology of one-liners
Attempts at compiling lists of logical mechanisms or devices underpinning jokes
(e.g. Hetzron 1991, Attardo 2001, Attardo et al. 2002) may be correct but cannot be
said to be exhaustive beyond a shadow of a doubt, given language users’ creativity
in constructing jokes. (Dynel 2009: 10)
3 We will first try to write a commented typology of one-liners, which, although it will be
several pages long, attempts to be short and synthetic.  We will,  for the time being,
make few references to pre-existing typologies, which do exist2, but tend to concern
jokes rather than one-liners as such—Dynel (2012) being an exception, since she started
with one-liners and later extended her approach to jokes. In other terms, we will also
try to keep in mind what makes one-liners specific.3
4 One-liners are of varied nature and the only common points they seem to have is that
they are short and are supposed to be funny. They can be found in a series of possible
forms and formats, and can be linked to different comedic traditions. Even though one-
liners (particularly, perhaps, the pun-based ones) tend to be associated with traditional
formats, a number contemporary comedians also make use of one-liners, sometimes
specializing in dirty or offensive uses of them (cf. Tim Vine or Jimmy Carr in the U.K.;
some of their lines are mentioned in the examples below). While one-liners seem to
share one common point, i.e. their length, here too there may be some variation.
5 In this study, we have compiled approximately 15,000 one-liners taken mostly from two
books (Tibball 2012, Tucker 2012), as well as from a few other individual sources (see
references below). They can be strictly speaking one-line-long if we take “line” in the
typographic sense, but they tend to be at least two lines long, and sometimes slightly
longer; in grammatical terms, they may be one sentence, but they can be made of up to
four sentences4. When they are uttered orally, one could think that the Conversation
Analysis unit “turn” could form an interesting describing tool for one-liners—except
that a number of one-liners are to be found in monological routines, where there is no,
or  very  little,  turn-taking at  work.  This  can,  in  turn,  lead  us  to  take  “line”  in  the
theatrical sense of the word, but (as was just said) if one-liners can contitute one short
(theatrical) line, they can also be part of a larger monologue. What could make them
independent units  is  their  environment:  there is  little,  or  no,  continuity with what
precedes or follows them. But there may be recurrent themes in a show, and further
reference can be made to a given one-liner in the course of a routine. This said, the
brevity of one-liners does seem to be linked to a form of self-containment, which has to
be taken into account, but which we will also try to challenge in this paper.
6 Another problem lies in the fact that other recognized genres or sub-genres can be
characterized by their linking of brevity and humour: riddles, pick-up lines and retorts
to such lines (“comebacks”); not all of them are funny, but some of them are supposed
to be, so that there may be partial overlap between the categories. Puns are frequently
found in jokes, but although one-liners are very often based on puns (as we shall see),
puns are not used solely in one-liners.  Certain codified comedic forms may also be
found and some of them may be found in longer form, such as stupid blonde jokes or my
wife/  girlfriend… jokes  (again,  see  below  for  more  details).  Outside  of  the  English-
speaking world, the French bon mot, or even the notorious blagues Carambar5 could be
classified as one-liners too. Finally, one-liners based on observational humour may also,
in turn, come to resemble proverbs, or wisdom writings.
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7 A one-liner is,  therefore, short and funny. One-liners do seem to have a number of
characteristics  in  common  and  can  (often)  be  recognized  intuitively,  but  the
boundaries of the genre may be hard to establish. Despite the differences, a number of
recurring  patterns  and  devices  can  be  found,  and  a  rough  classification  proposed.
There may be a number of borderline or complex cases, but in the vast majority of
examples, one-liners can fall under at least one of the following broad categories.
8 For the purposes of this paper, we will propose a typology that is partly connected with
the  main  linguistic device  they  are  based  upon,  since  one-liners  are  often—but  not
always—made possible by some property of language that is played upon/with. But not
all one-liners are strictly speaking based on a given device, as we will see; nevertheless,
they are always at least partly linguistic inasmuch as they rely on language (they are
verbal games). To speak of a main device does not mean, of course, that it is the only
device that is to be found in a given one-liner. The classification will provide us with a




9 A large number of one-liners rely on puns.6 Puns have been extensively discussed in the
literature—if  one  humorous  device  is  discussed,  it  tends  to  be  puns,  which  are
sometimes treated as the “simplest” cases (Ritchie 2004), which we will argue they are
not. They may not be the funniest of one-liners, although this can be cultural thing or a
question of taste; Ritchie in fact says that puns can be met with groans, rather than
laughter. This partly goes beyond the limits of this paper, although (as was said before)
a few elements having to do with the connection between form and comedic value will
be examined below in our last section.
10 Puns may be  assumed to  function at  the  lexical  level  only,  i.e.  revolve  around the
interpretation of “one word”; two of the word’s meanings, or uses, are activated at the
same  time,  or  alternatively.  This  needs  clarification.  What  the  writer  and/or  the
comedian seems to be taking advantage of is polysemy, or, rather, the multiple uses of a
word (in bold, below):7
(1)
a. I entered a swimming contest at the weekend. I won the 100m butterfly. What
am I going to do with an insect that big? 
b. The judge has got a stutter, so it doesn’t look like I’m getting a sentence. 
c. I told a volcano joke down the pub last night. The whole place erupted.
d. My friend is sick to death of people always taking the piss out of him for having
brittle bone disease. One day he’s going to snap.
e. My doctor told me that I had to give up drinking. It’s been three days now and I
feel really dehydrated. 
f. Windmills: big fan; big, big fan. 
g. Every time I hear a joke, I throw up. It must be my gag reflex. 
h. I’ve reached the age where I can’t function without glasses. Especially if they’re
empty. 
i. I ordered a whole duck at a Chinese restaurant last night. It was great until I got
to the bill. 
j. Menstrual jokes are not funny. Period. 
k. Two soldiers are in a tank. One looks at the other and goes, ‘Blublublub!’ 
l. There are two fish in a tank. One turns to the other and says, ‘Do you know how
to drive this thing?’
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m. My girlfriend said she wanted me to tease her, so I said “Alright, fatty.” (Jimmy
Carr) 
n. When you eat a lot of spicy food, you can lose your taste. When I was in India last
summer, I was listening to a lot of Michael Bolton. (Jimmy Carr) 
11 Although lexical puns always seem to be involved, all these examples do not function in
the same way. The way in which drinking in (1e) is first made to bring to mind the idea
that someone is drinking alcohol may not be a specific use but a common pragmatic
inference when the verb is used intransitively; the fact that tease can be interpreted in
(1m) as being “nice” or “rough” teasing (the spectrum of teasing can go from gentle
bantering to near-insult) may also have to do with pragmatics, not semantics; the same
could perhaps be said to  what  taste applies  to  in  (1n).  Others  may just  be  cases  of
homophony,  with  the  usual  complications  encountered  when  a  tight  distinction  is
supposed to be made between homophony and polysemy: bill (beak/cheque) or tank in
examples  (1i,  k,  l),  could  be  cases  at  hand.  The  tests  that  can  be  used  to  make  a
distinction  between  homonymy  and  polysemy—for  instance,  Cruse  (2004)’s  use  of
anaphora—would suggest that tank has uses that are too different for a simultaneous or
very close activation of both senses to be possible; yet, the opposition between the two
meanings has been used (more or less) successfully in the preceding examples. The way
in which lexical forms are used in such cases could show that the types of differences
may not entirely matter, as long as two interpretations can be made to emerge; it might
at least be important to note that they may not all be of the same form.
12 Other types of wordplay are of course possible: two words are just homonymous when
they just sound the same, and two words are at least supposed to be distinct when they
are spelt differently:
(2)
a. I just saw a beautiful girl with a massive gut. What a waist.
13 This may not operate at word-level only:
(2)
b. I’m about to have a cup of dangerous coffee. Safe tea first.
c. There’s no need for women to behave the way they do on their period. It’s an
ovary action.
14 One speaks of paronomasia, or paronymy, when the words do not quite sound the same,
but almost do:
(3)
a. Avalanche: what Italians do every day at about half past twelve. (have a lunch)8
b. My granddad doesn’t like fried chicken, but my Nandos.
c. 11:59:59 a.m. is my favourite time of the day. It’s second to noon.
e. So this lorry full of tortoises collided with a van full of terrapins. It was a turtle
disaster. (Tim Vine)
b. Programmers do it beta.9
15 The word game may be based on the form of the word(s) itself, and different types of
such formal puns are possible. Visual puns based on spelling could be assumed to have
to be used in written form only, but, as is shown by (4), it is not necessarily the case:
(4)
a. Why oh why don’t people poof read stuff before they post it?
b. I have a friend who’s half Indian. Ian.
c. You can’t spell ‘prostitution’ without ‘STI’.
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16 The following two examples probably need to be seen in the written form, however, for
two meanings to emerge:
(4)
d. I was in a spelling bee once. But I lost because the other students cheeted.
e. The spell czech on my computer has never failed me yet.
17 In the case of (4c), the visual pun is also a lexical pun (‘STI’). The processes can be used
together, which again shows that they should not be thought of as exclusive.
 
1.2. Set phrases
18 Another large number of one-liners are based on set phrases. This is interesting per se:
set  phrases  have  been  considered  to  be  non-transparent  forms  in  which  the
relationship between form and meaning is (somewhat) fixed, but it has also been shown
that it is not necessarily the case (Mejri 2005): although they are supposed to be frozen,
they, in fact, can often be modified.10 Here are a few examples:
(5)
a.  The  easiest  way  to  add insult  to  injury is  when you’re  signing  somebody’s
plaster cast.
b. There’s a race war going on in my kitchen. It all started when the pot called the
kettle black.
c.  I’ve got a friend who has got a butler whose left arm is missing—serves him
right! (Tim Vine)
d. Crystal balls: I don’t know what people see in them.
e. It pains me to say it, but I have a sore throat.
f. I love my satnav. I don’t know where I’d be without it.
g. Some people say it’s hard being a hostage. Pfff… I could do it with my hands
tied behind my back.
h. I’m so good at sleep, I can do it with my eyes closed.
19 The whole phrase tends to receive a double interpretation, and the “literal”, which, in
this case, is also rather strikingly the less salient 11, meaning is (also?) “activated”. An
opposition could be made with the preceding cases in which simple words seemed to be
concerned, but as we will see below, thinking that interpretation only operates at the
word-level even for the preceding examples might be a mistake. The structure of the
next two examples is complex: the whole one-liner comes to be read as a retake on a
proverb that is not stated in full:
(6)
a. I’ve just finished building Rome with my nephew’s Lego. Took me a day.
b. I eat an apple every day. The wife’s a doctor.
 
1.3. Structural, or syntactic, ambiguity
20 Another linguistic phenomenon that can be made use of is ambiguous syntax. It does
seem rarer than word- or fixed-expression-based puns—the rarity is also noted in Dynel
(2012)—, but examples can be found:
(7)
a. Reincarnation is making a comeback.
b. I’m not worried about the Third World War. That’s the Third World’s Problem.
(Jimmy Carr)
c. Throwing acid is wrong, in some people’s eyes. (Jimmy Carr)
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d. I live near a remedial school. There is a sign that says, slow… children.  That
can’t be good for their self-esteem. (Jimmy Carr)
e.  My wife  is  fed up of  my wordplay jokes.  I  asked,  ‘What can I  do to stop my
addiction?’ She said, ‘Whatever means necessary.’ ‘No it doesn’t,’ I said.
f. I saw a sign in a shop: ‘Mosquito nets £10.’ I didn’t even know bugs could play
the lottery.
g. I made a chicken salad last night. Apparently they prefer to eat grain.
h. I went to the game and saw a Mexican wave, so I waved back at him.
21 In such cases, the problem may still be, first and foremost, one of interpretation. Dynel
(2012) goes a step further, suggesting that:
if  [syntactic  ambiguity]  does  occur,  it  can  usually  be  explained  in  terms  of  lexical
ambiguity, for the shift in the grammatical category entails also a shift in the lexical
meaning (Dynel 2012: 11; emphasis added)
22 This seems slightly radical as (7a, b, g), for instance, which include making a comeback,
Third World War, make a chicken salad, are not truly speaking lexically ambiguous. The
fact that the ambiguity is (also) structural can in fact also account for the rarity of
examples, as they can be more difficult to come up with. (7c) only barely makes it; if it
is  to  be  used in  a  spoken  routine,  saying  it  out  loud  might  even  create  further
difficulties, since stress and intonation—nucleus placement, in particular, cf. also (7e),
(7g)—might need to be different according to the chosen meaning.
 
1.4. Implicatures, (in)direct speech acts, reference
23 In 1.1., we mentioned the fact that some of the apparently “lexical” puns could in fact
also be taken to be pragmatic in nature; certain examples may be more openly based on
problems traditionally ascribed to pragmatics, not semantics. The type of commonness
to be found in the next two examples could be linked to the presence of conventional
implicatures:
(8)
a. You know that look you get from women when they want you? Nah, me neither.
24 And the famous Groucho Marx line can also be mentioned here:
b. A child of 5 would know this. Bring me a child of 5! (Groucho Marx)
25 You know… is used when you are suggesting something that you, as the speaker, know,
and the hearer is expected to share; a child of five… normally implies that anyone over
five should be able to know it too, and this is what is denied in both cases.
26 Indirect speech acts may also be made to be interpreted literally, which brings this case
close to that of certain set expressions, although the way in which they have come to be
fixed may be different. The illocutionary level is ignored:
(9)
a. I saw a sign in a car park saying: “Thieves want your satnav.” I thought, “Well,
they can get lost!”
b. So I rang up a local building firm, I said “I want a skip outside my house.” He
said “I’m not stopping you.” (Tim Vine)
27 Certain discursive or conversational clichés (rather than idioms / collocations), may
also be used, as in:
(10)
My girlfriend bought a cookbook the other day called “Cheap and easy vegetarian
cooking”. Which is perfect for her, because not only is she vegetarian…  (Jimmy
Carr)
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28 As this is the first part of a common discursive phrase, the missing half can probably be
expected and reintroduced by the hearer(s).  Some interpretations are also based on
reference  problems,  rather  than  meaning.  The  following  example  may  seem  to  be
another instance of lexical ambiguity, but in fact, the word is taken to refer to distinct
realities.  What  is  at  stake  is  reference  rather  than meaning,  and  the  possibility  of
referring to different things in turn creates a form of interpretative ambiguity:
(11)
A Chinese couple are in bed. The husband says “I want a sixty-nine.” His wife says,
“You want beef and broccoli now?”
29 This is also linked to world knowledge or culture,12 as one needs to know how meals are
referred to in Chinese restaurants in order to understand it.
30 The following cases could still be linked to a form of reference taken in a broader sense,
but  they are  of  a  more specific  kind:  they rely  on cultural  knowledge,  rather than
linguistic devices (see discussion below). They include hints, quotations or fragments of
quotations (12c),  reference to known social practices (12i),  to a person’s or a brand
name (12a), a book, a commercial (12d), etc.
(12)
a. Maybe it’s Maybelline… and maybe it’s Photoshop.
b. Fox is so twentieth century.
c. My wife has just left me for Arnold Schwarzenegger. She’ll be back.
d.  African child dies?  I  watched those,  and couldn’t  help thinking,  “Well,  stop
clicking your fingers!” (Jimmy Carr)
e. I’m officially changing my remote’s name to Wally. 
f. And that, Romeo, is why we usually try to take a pulse first.
g.  Chaos:  what  erupts  when  he-who-lives-in-a-glass-house invites he-who-is-
without-a-sin for dinner.
h. So Batman came up to me & he hit me over the head with a vase & he went
T’PAU!  I  said  “Don’t  you  mean  KAPOW??”  He  said  “No,  I’ve  got  china  in  my
hand.” (Tim Vine, referring to an 80s pop song by T’Pau, ‘China in Your Hand’, 1987)
i. Some guy just gave me half of a peace sign.
31 The fact that these examples suppose cultural knowledge is incidentally revealed by the
presence of those in example (12d); its use shows that what is referred to is supposed to
belong to the speaker and hearer’s shared knowledge. Such one-liners may rely on the
pleasure of recognizing a reference (see Section 3); they also make it necessary to ‘get’
the  reference  if they  are  to  be  understood  at  all.  They  may  also  lead  to  a
reinterpretation of  a  situation  rather  than a  word or  phrase;  the  link  that  is  made
between remote controls and Where’s Wally? books in (12e) casts in a new light the fact
that people tend to leave their remote controls in hidden places. This makes some of
them close(r) to the next types of examples.
 
1.5. Logical fallacies, observational and absurdist humour
32 The next series of examples are also language-based (they have to be), but no longer
use language self-referentially: they involve an analysis, or a striking representation of
a situation, a specific take on the world.
33 One  recurrent  type  is  based  on  logical  fallacies:  non  sequiturs,  tautologies,  logical
reinforcement of a contradiction… Mental diseases seem to form a frequent topic in
one-liners based on self-contradiction: a type of behaviour is described, and what is
described proves that the fictional speaker and patient has the disease that s/he is
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claiming not to have. This creates a “discrepancy” between what is said and what is
implied to be the case.
(13)
a. All we ever do is ask questions: why?
b.  I’m  a  very  good  ventriloquist,  even  though  I  say  so  myself.  (combined  to  a
conversational cliché)
c. There are two types of people: those with Alzheimer’s.
d. I was thinking of writing a book, A Guide to Better Shoplifting—but who the hell is
going to buy it?
e. If you quit rehab, does that mean it worked?
f. Statistically, three in one people have schizophrenia.
g. My mate told me I just don’t understand irony. Which was ironic because we
were at the bus stop at the time.
h. My friends say I’ll believe anything. Damn, I suppose they’re right.
i. People call me Mr Compromise. It wasn’t my first choice for a nickname, but I can
live with it.
j. My friends say I’m too easy to please. I was delighted when they told me.
k. I’m not paranoid, but I’m sure people think I am.
l. I parked my car sideways over two disabled spaces. “What’s wrong? You look in
perfect health to me,” said the guard. “Schizophrenia,” we replied.
m. My girlfriend just left me because I’m so lazy. Insert your own punchline here.
(combined with the “my girlfriend...” pattern, see 1.6. below)
34 Another way of pointing out the absurdity of something is to propose a matter-of-fact
combination  of  data  that  reveals  an  oddity.  This  form  of  observational  humour  is
typically found in stand-up comedy routines, although for practical reasons we have
also drawn these examples from our book collections:
(14)
a. If you’re trying to improve your memory, lend someone money.
b. Breaking news: “Man lucky to be alive after being hit by a train.” I think I’m
luckier: I’ve never been hit by a train.
c. For just £10 a month you can reduce your annual salary by £120.
d. I saved loads of cash on the new iPhone yesterday. I didn’t buy one.
e. Hey Timex, if I end up 660ft under water, I’m pretty sure I won’t need a watch.
(combined with cultural reference to an advertisement)
f. Regular naps prevent ageing. Especially if you take them while driving.
g. Liven up your local library by hiding all the books on anger management.
35 In  these  cases,  a  whole  (often,  common)  situation  is  cast  in  a  new  light,  and  the
audience / reader is invited to think differently about it. The strangeness of a situation
can just be emphasized; some silly one-liners may remain surprising, or absurd:
(15)
a. Snakes: they’re like bits of rope, only angrier.
b. Apparently, 1 in 5 people in the world are Chinese. And there are 5 people in my
family,  so it  must be one of them. It’s  either my mum or my dad.  Or my older
brother Colin.  Or my younger brother Ho-Chan-Chu. But I  think it’s  Colin.  (Tim
Vine)
 
1.6. One-liner versions of joke templates
36 Finally (for the purposes of this typology), there are types of one-liners that can be
considered to form templates, some of which are common to longer jokes (cf. stupid
blonde jokes), others which are perhaps more specifically short because of their very
characteristics (yo-mamma jokes).  They could be considered to constitute sub-genres
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because  of  their  recurrent  characteristics  and  they  form  patterns  writers  have  to
embrace and play with. Here are a few examples.
Yo-mamma jokes: generally in the form Your mum is so X that Y, they are a form of ritualized
insult originally linked to the African-American community in the U.S., but they can now be
found  elsewhere.  The  speaker  insults  someone  else’s  mother  and  shows  their  own
superiority by coming up with something clever and inventive:
(16)
a. Your mum’s so stupid she went to DFS and bought a full-prize sofa.
37 The pattern can be extended to other types of hyperbolic one-liners of the Your X is so Y
that Z types; the speaker is supposed to be clever and inventive in his/her exaggeration
again:
(16)
b. Your head is so big that your ears are in different time zones.
My wife/girlfriend jokes: usually in the first person (and with a supposed male speaker), they
describe  something  that  the  wife  or  girlfriend blames  a  man for.  This  is  followed by  a
comeback, or by something that, as in the mental disease examples, confirms the presence
of what the girlfriend reproached the man with in the first place.
(17)
a. My wife says I’m full of my own importance. Anyway that’s enough about her…
b. My wife’s leaving me because she’s apparently fed up of me “quoting her all the
time”.
Definitions.  They  emulate  dictionary  definitions  but  are  either  silly  (cf.  observational
humour and/or absurdist humour), or may involve a pun; they are a specific pattern, but
some of the forms mentioned earlier may be found again— (12g) was already of this type—:
(18)
a. Exaggeration: without it the world would end.
b. Anti-gravity: it never lets you down.
… walks into a bar jokes. This is a famous template for jokes in the English-speaking world
which may sometimes also be used in one-liners:
(19)
Two dragons walk into a bar. One dragon says, “It’s warm in here.” The other says,
“Shut your mouth.”
Another well-known type of jokes is the stupid blonde joke, which may also be found in one-
liners, although they also tend to be longer jokes. Here is just one example amongst many:
(20)
I cheated on my blonde girlfriend and she found out. Which made her unsure if the
baby was hers.
38 Other cases could also be mentioned, such as light bulb jokes (How many X does it take to
change a light bulb?), but they tend to be riddles, i.e. a specific kind of form that may or
may not (truly) count as a one-liner, and nationality-based jokes (as in: A Frenchman, a
Scotsman and an Englishman walk into a bar…), which also tend to be longer jokes because
they usually need some minimal space for elaboration.  Although examples (16)-(20)
form recurrent  templates,  the  characteristics  found in  these  one-liners  can still  be
linked to other cases, as shown earlier, but the fact that they constitute (semi-)fixed
forms can be included in the forthcoming discussion (in Section 3, in particular).
39 The following table summarizes the types of one-liners discussed in this section. The
headings provided in the left column are an indication of possible groupings for the
devices mentioned in the right column, but it should be noted, again, that they may not
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separated from the others because they can be thought to operate at a different level;
this is briefly taken up in the discussion (Section 3).
 






(4) puns, visual and formal
Set phrases
(5) set phrases: meaning of set phrases
(6) indirect allusions to phrases / incomplete phrases
Ambiguous syntax (7) ambiguous syntax
Pragmatics / discourse-based
(8) implicatures, diverse cases
(9) implicatures, indirect speech acts
(10) discursive / conversational clichés
(11) lexical, but reference
(12) cultural references
Logical fallacies; observational humour
(13) internal contradictions (with example of diseases)
(14) observational humour: gnomic statements
(15) absurdist humour: absurd, silly… statements
+ Set-types of  jokes: (16) Yo mamma jokes; (17) My wife/ girlfriend jokes; (18) Definitions; (19)
Walks into a bar jokes; (20) Stupid blonde jokes...
40 As was announced earlier, we will now discuss what the abovementioned examples can
say about the emergence of meaning in context. What we will try to show is what one-
liners can bring to the discussion; the combination of some of the factors we are about to
examine is, in particular, part of the problem. Let us therefore try and see what one-
liners have to say about (re)interpretation processes, and contextual meaning.
 
2. One liners, (re)interpretation, and contextual
meaning
41 In a number of examples,  one interpretation could be supposed to be formed by the
reader / audience, a second interpretation is also formed, and it could seem that the
discrepancy between both interpretations might be a/the source of humour. This could
perhaps for instance be said of examples (1)-(4), (5)-(6), (7), (8)-(11), and perhaps (12).
The case of examples (13)-(15) can be brought into question, although they, in fact,
might not be the best counter-examples, as we shall see below. Is this analysis correct?
If there is such a double interpretation, how can its emergence be accounted for; what
is an “interpretation”? It seems necessary to go into some detail and name some of the
parameters at stake.
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2.1. Interpretation/reinterpretation and merged interpretation
42 The fact that the structure of jokes tends to be binary has already been said of jokes in
general:
One  of  the  first  conceptualisations  of  jokes’  structuring  is  credited  to  Hockett
(1972/1977), according to whom, a joke comprises a build-up and a punch. (Dynel
2012: 7)
43 It  might  even  be  truer  of  one-liners  which,  as  said  earlier,  do  not  allow  for  an
elaboration  phase  because  of  their  brevity.  It  could  be  supposed,  then,  that  the
following pattern is the norm and constitutes the basic form for one-liners:
build-up: interpretation 1,
followed by punch: reveal, interpretation 1 is wrong → interpretation 2
44 A number of one-liners could be described in this way, such as in examples (1a) and
(1e):13
(1)
a. I entered a swimming contest at the weekend. I won the 100m butterfly. 
What am I going to do with an insect that big?
e. My doctor told me that I had to give up drinking. It’s been three days now and
I feel really dehydrated.
45 In these examples, the second part of the joke reveals an interpretation that was not
available in the first part. This model quickly reaches its limits, however, something
which Dynel (2012) has brought into focus, showing that one-liners are not all based on
the “garden path” mechanism,  i.e.  following a pattern in which a first  part  leads the
listener astray, before a second part reintroduces a new, “correct”, meaning. “Garden
path” is not a term that Dynel invented for the analysis of jokes: the term refers to
sentences  in  which a  first  meaning is  supposed to  be computed and then rejected,
because something makes it impossible to keep the first interpretation. A well-known
example of such sentences is The horse raced past the barn fell, which is not humorous.14
46 We would like to agree with Dynel, but we can perhaps go one step further: does the
comparison with garden path sentences truly apply even for some jokes that seem to
fall under this category? In The horse raced…, no first, “full”, meaning is ever achieved,
or, at any rate, the “first” meaning has to be abandoned—some examples of garden path
sentences discussed in Bever (1970) are in fact difficult to interpret, and the paper is a
reflection on what makes something interpretable. Dynel (2012) often uses the term
“cancel” to refer to what happens to the “first” interpretation. In our examples, the
“first” meaning may not, in fact, be cancelled, and it often is not. Even in (1a), the insect-
butterfly is supposed to have been won at a swimming competition: in other words, the
swimming is part of the content of the situation in which butterfly is intended to mean
insect; the cancellation, if it exists, is incomplete. The two contexts are, in fact, merged,
instead of having one interpretation cancelled and another one replacing / erasing it.
In many cases, interpretations (i.e., here, the result of the interpretation, so to speak:
how they are probably understood) are not cancelled at all: a given form is made to
have several meanings at once, or sequentially. This is the case of examples (1b, c, d, …):
(1)
b. The judge has got a stutter, so it doesn’t look like I’m getting a sentence. 
c. I told a volcano joke down the pub last night. The whole place erupted.
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d. My friend is sick to death of people always taking the piss out of him for having
brittle bone disease. One day he’s going to snap.
g. Every time I hear a joke, I throw up. It must be my gag reflex. 
h. I’ve reached the age where I can’t function without glasses. Especially if they’re
empty. 
47 several  meanings are activated simultaneously  (eg.  sentence,  erupted,  snap,  gag)  rather
than one being cancelled by the other. In (1h), the fact that glasses is made to mean
drinking  glasses  does  not  mean  that  glasses  can  no  longer  be  thought  of  as  being
spectacles as well; but a meaning that was not, for lack of a better word, salient, is now
made to  be  available.15 In  the  two (fish/army) tank  one-liners,  even if  the  “second”
interpretation  is  made  available,  the  situation  in  which  the  reference  to  them  is
inserted is still associated to the “first” meaning of the word:16
(1)
k. Two soldiers are in a tank. One looks at the other and goes, ‘Blublublub!’
l. There are two fish in a tank. One turns to the other and says, ‘Do you know how
to drive this thing?’
48 “Blublublub” brings  to  mind a  fish tank,  but  the  “soldiers”  are  still  soldiers  in  the
second half of the one-liner, they have not transformed into fish, or not entirely (this
can also be linked to the use of anaphora: “one” and “the other” are still  linked to
“soldiers”); they “are” also still “in a” tank (this part is not cancelled).
49 In (1l), the fish have become potential drivers, so they probably are drivers of army
tanks, and they speak, but they are still fish; besides, the fact that they are speaking is
not directly related to the pun on tank, it is just another dimension that is added to the
representation  of  the  fish  that  are  now  talking fish,  but  there  is  no  necessary
connection to the use of tank.
50 This  might  lead  to  the  idea  that  what  is  sought  is  not  (just)  interpretation  and
reinterpretation,  but  multiple  interpretation,  successive  or  simultaneous,  and,  even,
merged.  In  other  words,  part  of  the  pleasure  might  come  from  the  fact  that  the
meaning is enriched and unstable and multiple, and not, or not necessarily, that there
is  one,  and then another  way of  understanding it.  Even though some interpretations
might be made to become salient later in the relatively short process of “getting” a one-
liner, in the end interpretations can be, or tend to be merged,  i.e. they are not kept
separate.
51 Another aspect may be mentioned here which is linked to, and may be a consequence
of,  what  has  just  been  said.  Dynel  (2012)  has  rightly  pointed  out  that  one given
mechanism has been thought to be more systematically present than is really the case.
But although we agree that the typology of jokes must be enriched and complexified,
perhaps focusing on where and/or how the “reveal” takes place 17 might not be of the
essence if one is supposed to be dealing with multiple interpretations. Maybe this also
focuses too much on interpretation as the selection of one clear, pre-defined option (as is
sometimes the case in analyses that are based on “multiple”—i.e. discrete—meanings,
or tiers).18 The crossroads mechanism is called this way because the hearer is supposed to
be metaphorically at a crossroads, i.e. he/she is possibly hesitating between two discrete,
separate  options.  But  are  they  discrete  and  separate?  Where  it  happens  might  not
necessarily  prove  central  to  distinguish  whether  the  mechanism  itself  is  (perhaps
partly) the same. Focusing too much on discrete, separate, internally logical worlds may
also be something that the “incongruity approach” to humour (used, among others, by
Dynel)  could  be  criticized  for.19 The  fact  that  something  is  deemed  incongruous  is
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sometimes linked to the idea that it conflicts with “the standards of the real world,” or
“conflicting with one’s knowledge of the world” (Dynel 2012). But do we actually have
(logically)  organized,  self-contained  areas  which  we  refuse  to  combine?  We  may
sometimes seek representations of this kind when constructing theoretical models, but
doubt whether these models truly correspond to natural representations of the world.
All in all, all of this supposes that meanings are discrete, (automatically?) processed,
and that the interpretation of a one-liner can be delineated in terms of what it is, ie. it
could be “spelt out” entirely. Because worlds may vary from one individual to another,
perhaps another question could be be: spelt out for, or by, whom? And yet, one-liners
often do seem to be based on interpretations supposedly commonly accessed by several
independent speakers. In the next sub-section, we will discuss this possible paradox.
 
2.2. Default/preferred readings
52 Can interpretations be expected to be the same for all hearers, or, for that matter, for
the deviser and the hearer? A number of one-liners seem to rely on the hope, on the
deviser’s  part,  that  the  same  (mis-)assumptions  will  be  made,  and  then  that  re-
interpretations will work in a common way—hopefully, the same for all members of the
audience,  and,  hopefully,  the  same as  the  one  expected  by  the  deviser.  This  could
suggest that there is  a preferred collective interpretation,  one sometimes taken for
granted  as  the  default,  or  preferred,  reading—a  notion  which  is  not  necessarily
challenged.20 But this is, in fact, an interesting, but complex, problem in itself, and we
will try to see how a (fixed, set, predetermined) default reading may not necessarily
need to be posited, although we do believe that there are several sides to this problem.
The issue is  (partly)  related to that of whether interpretations are discrete,  since a
common interpretation would probably have to be discrete for it to be truly “common”,
although that  might  not  be  entirely  necessary.  At  this  point,  we  could  distinguish
between  default  meaning  and  default  interpretation: one  is  ascribed  rigidly  and
acontextually  to  a  given  entity,  the  other  one  is  computed  and  constructed
contextually.
53 The fact that a number of set phrases, clichés (linguistic or cultural), and references are
used probably ensures that certain assumptions are made, but it does not follow that it
is an automatic, rather than a dynamic, process. A number of one-liners use forms that
are relatively set, making one particular interpretation more plausible; although there
may  not  be  direct  form-to-meaning  equivalence,  a  certain  interpretation  may  be
entrenched enough for  it  to  come to  mind quickly.21 There  might  be  some sort  of
priming (i.e., something comes to mind first) at work.
54 Lexical ambiguity does not necessarily allow for such immediate priming, except if one
use is much more common than others, and therefore “salient”—but the question is
known to be a thorny one: prototypes may play a role here, or frequency, or both. Now
it is doubtful whether there is an a-contextual preferred interpretation for glass or tank;
there probably is not. The cases that are based on puns may be the most old-fashioned
types, but they are not the simplest cases to explain—quite the contrary. In such cases,
(relatively)  discrete  interpretations  seem  to  come  to  mind  (in  other  words,  it  is
possible,  and  often  easy,  to  paraphrase  the  “meaning”  of  the  word),  but  this
interpretation is not a default meaning at the level of langage. It could nevertheless be
assumed that a use is made salient at the level of langue.
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55 We should now return to the fact that one-liners are supposed to be self-contained
forms: they are self-contained because they need not be, and often are not, enclosed in
a coherent narrative (with something coming before it and something coming after it),
but they are also linked to a cultural context which means that not everything has to be
computed from the one-liner itself. In fact, a small proportion of what is understood
may be.  Besides,  even  if  one-liners  are  short,  they  also  provide  contextual,  i.e.  co-
textual, clues, in particular for cases of linguistic ambiguity, which could be analysed in
terms of frayage (“path-opening”, Culioli), even though we might be using this notion in
a larger sense that just the presence of one given utterance that paves the way for
interpretation  (“énoncé  précurseur”,  Culioli  1990:  124).  We  agree  here  with  the
suggestion made in Jaszczolt  (2010)  when she proposes that  interpretation is  not  a
question  of  semantics  first,  or  semantics  only,  and  then  pragmatics,  but  that
interpretation  may  be  constructed  with  the  interaction  of  both  levels.  Given  the
abovementioned examples, the contextual clues that can be found in them despite their
brevity  provide  sufficient  background  for  one  possible  interpretation  to  be  made
prominent, although not exclusive:
(1)
a. I entered a swimming contest at the weekend. I won the 100m butterfly. 
e. My doctor told me that I had to give up drinking. 
h. I’ve reached the age where I can’t function without glasses. 
k. Two soldiers are in a tank. 
l. There are two fish in a tank. 
n. When you eat a lot of spicy food, you can lose your taste. 
56 Both interpretations may be opened at the same time, or successively, and some of the
hints  may even have to be understand retrospectively (but  probably remain in the
listener’s mind when s/he hears the rest of the line, without necessarily requiring any
effort, particularly if the one-liner is used orally):
(1)
b. The judge has got a stutter, so it doesn’t look like I’m getting a sentence. 
c. I told a volcano joke down the pub last night. The whole place erupted.
d. My friend is sick to death of people always taking the piss out of him for having brittle
bone disease. One day he’s going to snap. 
g. Every time I hear a joke, I throw up. It must be my gag reflex. 
i. I ordered a whole duck at a Chinese restaurant last night. It was great until I got to
the bill.
57 Interpretation is a combination of co-textual and cultural clues, which will probably
lead members of the audience that belong to the same, or partly similar, cultural and
linguistic background to reach the same conclusion. For one-liners, which can work as
self-contained units,  an interpretation may need to be at  least  minimally opened to
occur, but the self-contained co-text of the one-liner is not the only clue that comes
into play. So several interpretations may be permitted successively or conjointly by the
lexical and cultural knowledge of the hearer; they are contextually constructed and,
therefore,  primed  (priming  being  an  active  process  in  this  case).  As  said  earlier,
contextual opening need not just be lexical: the position in a sentence, for instance,
may also constitute such an interpretation-building hint:
(1j). Menstrual jokes are not funny. Period.
58 The use of period in a final, isolated position brings “full stop”’ to mind. The opening is
not lexical, but constructional, so to speak. Other contextual elements may play a role,
such as intonation (which will not be discussed here); but they may all contribute to
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bring to the fore one interpretation that will probably be of the same kind for a given
group of people who share a certain cultural and linguistic background.
59 A set phrase might constitute its own opening, as frequency and (semi-)fixedness can
allow for conventional, salient interpretations; co-textual information may become less
necessary  because  there  is  one  “default”  reading  for  set  phrases,  or,  rather,  a
commonplace,  frequent  reading—conventional  is  not  the  same  as  default.  The  less
common interpretation is probably going to be the one that needs more overt opening
as it is less immediately available. This can account for their strong presence in one-
liners, since they vastly facilitate the deviser’s (and the hearer’s) work. But fixedness
and set default meanings do not necessarily need to be posited to explain how a given
interpretation is constructed in certain one-liners.
60 In cases of structural ambiguity, interpretation can also go both ways. But, again, co-
textual  elements  are  still  present,  and,  again,  context  is  also  cultural,  as  can  be
illustrated by I made chicken salad (7g), in which one of the situations is evidently more
probable than the other; the same can be said for Third World War (7b), or for slow…
children (7d), in which the second meaning is made more apparent when that can’t be
good for their self-esteem is added. But this is something that is only likely to be present in
a given hearer, because of what they know, culturally,  linguistically—all of this is a
matter of probability and of comparative saliency, and a sort of (safer, or less safe) bet
on the part of the deviser, which also means that the deviser can fail. This also suggests
that  culture  and  co-text  function  together  to  create  such  saliency  (although  not
necessarily entirely in the same way). Pragmatics and semantics both play a role, as is
mentioned in Jaszczolt (2005, 2010), but this might not call for “default” (pre-counted,
discrete) interpretations. And it does not mean that all hearers will hear it in the same
way, or that it will be understood by an “ideal” hearer in the fixed, discrete form that
the deviser had in mind.22
 
2.3. To what extent are language-based one-liners specific?
61 We have just mentioned language and culture, showing that one-liners can be both
opposed, with the use of different devices, all the while being connected, given that
language and cultural references need not be opposed at a more general level.  One
question that can finally be discussed is whether previous remarks on interpretation
apply only, or mostly, to language-based one-liners (puns, etc.), or whether they can be
extended to cultural cases, too. The process of creation of multiple interpretations is
perhaps generally present in all examples, and could be extended to cases that do not
openly rely on linguistic material, such as examples (12), which reinforces the idea that
one-liners are not always based on linguistic ambiguity:
(12)
a. Maybe it’s Maybelline… and maybe it’s Photoshop.
b. Fox is so twentieth century.
c. My wife has just left me for Arnold Schwarzenegger. She’ll be back.
d.  African  child  dies?  I  watched  those,  and  couldn’t  help  thinking,  “Well,  stop
clicking your fingers!” (J. Carr)
e. I’m officially changing my remote’s name to Wally. 
f. And that, Romeo, is why we usually try to take a pulse first.
g.  Chaos:  what  erupts  when  he-who-lives-in-a-glass-house  invites  he-who-is-
without-a-sin for dinner.
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h. So Batman came up to me & he hit me over the head with a vase and he went
“T’PAU!”  I  said  “Don’t  you  mean KAPOW??”  He  said  “No,  I’ve  got  china  in  my
hand.” (Tim Vine)
i. Some guy just gave me half of a peace sign.
62 In  these  examples,  some  light  (not  necessarily  “new”,  as  old  clichés  may  also  be
confirmed) is shed on a given situation, by drawing together contexts that may not
usually function together, such as in the way in which the wife “will be back” in (12c),
or the comparison between the impossibility of finding a remote control and finding
Wally in (12e). But it is also a form of merger, where knowledge of a given context comes
to  enrich  the knowledge  of  a  first  context,  without  there  being  any  (total?)
cancellation, and without there being any need to posit two opposed, separate contexts.23
In cases linked to observational humour, the previous way of seeing something has
been enriched,  but  nothing has  necessarily  been cancelled  and replaced with a  new
belief. So in the end, the opposition between what is based on language and what is
based on culture  may not  be  entirely  relevant  at  this  level  of  the  analysis.  Merged
interpretations could be sought in a number of cases regardless of the (main) device
upon which they are based. The device provides the tool that is used, and the merged
interpretation is (one of) the result(s)24 that is sought by someone using a one-liner. Re-
analysis may be present in the logical fallacy examples as well, but here too, the second
part does not cancel the first; the effect comes from the connection of both parts, not
from the fact that the first part is cancelled because the second part contradicts it; this
would in fact make the whole line pointless:
(13)
a. All we ever do is ask questions: why?
b. I’m a very good ventriloquist, even though I say so myself. 
c. There are two types of people: those with Alzheimer’s.
d. I was thinking of writing a book, A Guide to Better Shoplifting—but who the hell is
going to buy it?
e. If you quit rehab, does that mean it worked?
f. Statistically, three in one people have schizophrenia.
g. My mate told me I just don’t understand irony. Which was ironic because we
were at the bus stop at the time.
h. My friends say I’ll believe anything. Damn, I suppose they’re right., etc.
63 This said, understanding a one-liner does not necessarily make it funny, which leads us
to the last part of this paper, in which we will make brief remarks on the comic value of
one-liners and its links with the question of interpretation.
 
3. Now, is this funny? Felicitousness and
infelicitousness, or: one-liners, genre and creativity
64 The preceding remarks have sometimes led us to leave aside an important aspect of
one-liners: they are supposed to be funny. Certain studies sometimes seem to equate
the question of understanding a one-liner with the fact of finding it funny, thinking that
explaining how they can be understood explains away what they are, and is sufficient
to account for their humorous value. This, however, is not the case. If we use one of
Austin’s terms which pragmatics literature often resorts to, one could say that one-
liners may be more or less felicitous. Two conditions may be required for them to be
felicitous: a) they should be understood; b) they should be thought funny. But even
though  it  might  perhaps  be  better  if  they  are  conjoined,  these  conditions  can  be
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independently met. Understanding a joke may not mean that the joke is considered
funny, and a joke might be considered funny even if it is not understood—as when only
parts of the joke are understood, or when the joke is misunderstood (a case we do not
have space to discuss here), or when the delivery itself causes laughter. Incidentally,
this  again shows that  incongruity  does not  necessarily  account for  the presence of
humour, since a joke that is already known may still be considered funny—or not—if told
with brio, used in the right context, etc.
65 The  funniness  of  a  one-liner  is  of  course  hard  to  define,  and  is  probably  context-
dependent,  (sub-)genre  dependent,  and  even,  sometimes,  simply  idiosyncratic.  The
pleasure of recognizing a good pun, of seeing several meanings at once, may already
constitute a form of felicity, without necessarily creating an uproar—some people may
have  a  taste  for  puns,  others  find  them  stale  and  ‘easy’.  Understanding  a  merged
representation of something such as (13e) can lead to laughter, a smile, or perhaps,
occasionally,  just interrogation (“finally,  does  it?”).  The sub-genres mentioned earlier
may also come into play now, as they have become templates audiences can be used to:
recognition of  the type of  jokes may cause pleasure (or displeasure),  and creativity
within a given pattern is what an audience may go for. Cultural recognition of a pattern
may help  a  hearer  recognize  that  the  joke  is  a  joke,25 and  might  also  constitute  a
template against which the current joke is assessed. Yo-mamma jokes seem to be based
on a sense of creativity: if you find an original connection and outwit your adversary,
your line can be deemed good. But this is also (sub-)genre-dependent: paradoxically,
paranomasia-based one-liners may be most appreciated when they are “not” good, i.e.
when they are almost infelicitous; the more approximate and risky they are, the better
they can be thought to be. Different types of horizons of expectations can also be at
work in relation to a given comedian, a series of films, a type of show, sometimes in
relation to  the  use  of  such and such a  device,  as  well.  Tim Vine is  famous for  his
collection of pun-based one-liners that come in quick succession.  His audience may
expect series of complex puns, and the more complex, the better. In Jimmy Carr’s case,
the audience may be getting ready to see how risqué his one-liners can get: the ruder,
the better. Woody Allen’s one-liners can be expected to be wry, etc.
66 What was said before about contextual interpretation is  partly independent of this,
since we have said that interpretation and humour are not necessarily linked. But there
are, in fact, possible connections between the interpretation of one-liners, their comedic
value and their forms; the two dimensions (interpretation / comedic value) may work
together but may also turn out to be conflictual. Heavy opening, for instance, can make
a  pun much more  understandable,  but  totally  unfunny.  The  lines  also  ought  to  be
written in  a  way that  makes  it  possible  to  deliver  them orally,  and this  can bring
limitations to how syntactic ambiguity can be used, as was pointed out before, since a
given parsing may call for specific intonation. Interpretation and comedic value are not
one and the same thing, but the humorous dimension of one-liners may in fact have




67 In this paper, we have looked at one-liners from a linguistic(s) point of view, and in so
doing, we have pointed out a number of questions that they seem to illustrate and
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which are often central to linguistic theory: default meaning(s), saliency/priming, the
role of context, what an interpretation can be, the respective role of the semantic and
pragmatic tiers, for instance.
68 We have tried to show that the interpretation of one-liners was a dynamic process, and
suggested  that  merged  interpretations  play  a  very  important  role,  as  opposed  to
successive discrete interpretations in which one interpretation cancels out the other.
Dynel (2012) is correct when she argues that more patterns exist than the one in which
there is a late cancellation of a first hypothesis, but the process of cancellation needs
further  inquiry.  Although incongruity  may be  present  in  a  number  of  cases,  a  few
arguments stemming from the incongruity theory of humour have also been discussed
(i.e.  something  incongruous  is  not  necessarily  funny  and  something  funny  is  not
necessarily  incongruous),  and we have pointed out  some aspects  of  the  interaction
between the humorous dimension of one-liners and the fact that they may need to be at
least interpretable—more opening may make a line more understandable, for instance,
but  a  heavy  opening  might  ruin  the  comedic  effect,  suggesting  that  conflicting
strategies may be at stake.
69 Lastly, we have suggested that interpretability is not the same thing as comedic value.
While some studies suggest that a one-liner is explained when its meaning(s) are made
clear(er), understanding something does not make it funny; it could be a prerequisite,
but  even  that  point  may  be  challenged.  The  perception  of  humour  may  be  highly
context-dependent (i.e. dependent on genre, on the hearer’s tastes and expectations,
on the hearer’s perception of the speaker, etc.), which might make a given one-liner
felicitous for some in a certain context, but not for others in another. While additional
issues would require further study, we hope to have shown that one-liners are, or can
be, good revealers of linguistic problems, and perhaps other, broader subjects as well.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Attardo, Salvatore. Linguistic Theories of Humour. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1994.
Aaron, Debra. Jokes and the Linguistic Mind. London: Routledge, 2012.
Carroll, Noel. Humour: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2014.
Cruse, Alan. Meaning in Language: An Introduction to Semantics and Pragmatics. 3rd edition. Oxford:
Oxford UP, 2011.
Clark, H.H. Using Language. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge UP, 1996.
Culioli, Antoine. “Formes schématiques et domaine”, Pour une linguistique de l’énonciation, Tome 1,
Opérations et représentations. Paris: Ophrys, [1987]1990. 115-126.
Dynel, Marta. Humorous Garden-Paths: A Pragmatic-Cognitive Study. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars
Publishing, 2009.
Dynel, Marta. “Garden Paths, Red Lights and Crossroads: On Finding Our Way to Understanding
the Cognitive Mechanisms Underlying Jokes”. Israeli Journal of Humor Research 1.1 (2012). 6-28. 
One-liners and Linguistics: (Re)Interpretation, Context and Meaning




Fauconnier, Gilles. Espaces mentaux. Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1984.
Gréciano, Gertrud. Signification et dénotation en allemand. La sémantique des expressions idiomatiques.
Metz: Université de Metz, 1983.
Gross, Gaston. Les expressions figées en français. Paris: Ophrys, 1996.
Jaszczolt, Katarina. Default Semantics: Foundations of a Compositional Theory of Acts of Communication.
Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005. 
Jaszczolt, Katarina. “Default Semantics”. The Oxford Handbook of Linguistic Analysis. Ed. B. Heine &
H. Narrog. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010. 193-221.
Levinson, Stephen. Pragmatics. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1983.
Mejri, Salah. “Figement absolu ou relatif : la notion de degré de figement”. Linx 53 (2005):
183-196. DOI: 10.4000/linx.283
Ritchie, Graeme. The Linguistic Analysis of Jokes. London: Routledge, 2004.
Sanz, Montserrat, Laka, Itziar, and Tanenhaus, Michael K. Language Down the Garden Path: The
Cognitive and Biological Basis for Linguistic Structures. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2013.
 
Corpus/one-liners
Tibballs, Geoff, ed. The Mammoth Book of One-Liners. London: Robinson, 2012.
Tucker, Grant. 5,000 Great One-Liners. London: Robson P., 2012. 
Best, Steve. Comedy Snapshots. London: Articul8 Publishing, 2014.
Vine, Tim. The Biggest Ever Tim Vine Joke Book. London: Century, 2010.
 
Stand-up comedy shows
The stand-up comedy shows that were mostly used and cited for this study are Jimmy Carr’s and
Tim Vine’s, and more especially Jimmy Carr, Laughing and Joking, 2013, Channel 4 DVDs. Groucho
Marx lines have been compiled from the films themselves, and Duck Soup in particular has been
viewed again in relation to this study. Woody Allen quotes had also originally been compiled.
Unfortunately, they have not made it into the final version of this paper. This sad fact may recall
one of Allen’s quips: “The other day I was alone and a man came up to me and kept saying over
and over again, ‘You’re a star, you’re a star.’ I thought, this year I’m a star, but what will I be next
year—a black hole?” 
NOTES
1. It should be noted that, in this paper, “routine” is used as in “stand-up routine”, a term used
by  comedians  to  refer  to  their  show,  and  often  more  specifically,  the  sequentially  ordered
content of the show. It is therefore not synonymous with “pattern”, or “template”, which are
also used in the paper to refer to codified forms for one-liners and jokes.
2. We cannot say that “there is no currently no theory of how humour works” (Ritchie 2004,
introduction).  There  is  a  long  tradition  of  trying  to  account  for  humour,  linguistically  (e.g.,
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Attardo 1994) but also more generally: the incongruity theory, the superiority theory, the relief
theory;  Freudian  analyses,  Aristotelian  analyses,  Kantian  analyses,  Bergsonian  analyses,  etc.
What may be true is that there is no recognized theory of how it works, since how and when
humour appeared is still very much a mystery. We will not delve into these debates in this paper;
among  many other  possible  sources,  see  for  instance  Carroll  (2014).  A  few  aspects  of  the
incongruity theory are discussed in the course of the paper, however.
3. Aaron (2012) proposes a general classification of jokes, not one-liners, specifically, assigning
them to the syntax, phonetic, semantic… tiers of language. We have not tried to follow this, or
one, predefined classification as we tried to focus on what seemed to be relevant to this analysis.
A  presentation  of  Dynel  (2012)’s  typology,  which  is  part  and  parcel  of  her  approach,  will
nonetheless be included in Section 2.
4. This statement supposes that we know what a sentence is, which is not necessarily true.
5. Daft,  children-directed  short  jokes  or  riddles  that  are  printed  on  the  back  of  the  paper
wrappers of Carambar, a caramel sweet.
6. We will not put forward any statistics because they would be entirely irrelevant: despite the
large  size  of  the  collections  (approx.  15,000),  they  are  not  taken  to  be  qualitatively
representative.
7. Meanings are stable and lexicalized. Uses are values that are associated to certain contexts. 
8. This is reminiscent of the Italian-pronunciation-based puns to be found in Chico’s dialogues in
the Marx Brothers  movies.  Some of  the dialogues in the Marx Brothers  films can in fact  be
considered to be a quick succession of one-liners.
9. This, of course, works better in non-rhotic varieties of English.
10. For the very large literature on the topic, cf. for instance Mejri (2005), Gréciano (1983), Gross
(1996).
11. Since  “literal”  meaning  is  often  (wrongly)  assumed  to  be  the  easier  and  more  salient
meaning.
12. Culture is taken here to mean: what you know because you are part of a community that
shares a certain number of assumptions and values.
13. The aforementioned one-liners are reproduced again in this section to facilitate the reading
of the analysis; also, we will underline new aspects in bold to draw the reader’s attention to what
is being discussed in this Section.
14. The example is discussed in Bever (1970) and reprinted in Sanz, Laka & Tannehaus (2013).
15. Dynel also uses the term salient,  but a shift in saliency is not the same thing as a cancelled
meaning, and even a shift in saliency might not (always) be what is involved.
16. I wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting I should draw more attention to this
example.
17. Dynel  proposes  “a  tripartite  division  of  jokes  in  reference  to  their  incremental
development” (Dynel 2012: 7; bold added for emphasis): “three major mechanisms of linear joke
comprehension  can  be  distinguished,  depending  on  the  stages  and  means  of  incongruity
emergence and incongruity resolution”. For the record, as the crossroads mechanism is also mentioned
further down in this paragraph, the typology she proposes is the following: a) the “garden path
mechanism”, where the hearer is led to have one interpretation and then to change it; b) the
“red-lights mechanism”, where new, incongruous material is added and has to be integrated into
what  was  first  said;  c)  the  “crossroads  mechanism”,  when  the  beginning  of  the  joke  is
uninterpretable  and the  end of  the  joke  allows it  to  be  understood,  although it  can remain
unclear.
18. Clark (1996) seems to be using an analysis of meaning (and irony?) in terms of layers; layers
have the disavantage(s) of being both discrete and superimposed to each other. The discussion of
whether there should be different levels of interpretation is of course central to all Gricean and
post-Gricean pragmatics and these questions would need to be further developed.
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19. Other aspects of the theory can also be challenged: not everything that is incongruous is
funny (manifestations of dementia can be incongruous, but they may not be funny),  and not
everything that is funny is incongruous (one-liners based on observational humour can, in fact,
be tautological and be appreciated because they make the world more congruent rather than
incongruous).
20. See Dynel (2010). One can distinguish default, used by Jaszczolt (2005), and preferred, used by
Levinson (1983) in his discussion of conversation analysis. Only one aspect of the problem will be
mentioned for the time being: the question of whether “default” or “preferred” readings have to
be posited in one-liner analysis, and why.
21. Cultural  references can have the same role,  and the same effect,  although they can also
restrict the audience of a joke if too culture-specific.
22. The deviser and the hearer may need to be further differentiated (as opposed to Dynel 2010).
Writing a one-liner is making a bet on what can be understood and trying to be funny. Part of
this problem is mentioned in Section 3.
23. This may be reminiscent of Fauconnier’s mental spaces (1984), but what we have in mind may
not  be  self-contained  “spaces”  with  one  domain  mapped  onto  another  in  a  systematic  way;
partial colliding, or clashing, may be provoked, and connections of all  forms may be present
(some common to many, but individual differences have to be accommodated, too; see following
paragraph and Section 3).
24. See Section 3.
25. Dynel mentions the fact that “the interpreter is aware of the humorous frame signalled by the
speaker” (2012: 13).
ABSTRACTS
This  paper  examines  one-liners  from a  linguistics  point  of  view,  using  them to  address the
question of how meaning emerges in context. A typology of one-liners is first proposed, in which
the  devices  that  they  rely  on  are  first  described  and  discussed.  The  paper  then  tackles the
question of what they can illustrate of the contextual emergence of meaning, the emphasis being
put on constructedness. The paper argues in favour of the presence of merged representations,
as opposed to successive, discrete interpretations—one of which is cancelled in the course of
“getting” the one-liner. Additional remarks are made on how interpretability and humour are
not two aspects of one and the same question, and a short discussion is included of how the
formal and the functional dimensions can interact.
Dans  cet  article,  on  envisage  les  one-liners  (blagues  courtes  supposées  constituer  une  seule
réplique) à partir de problématiques linguistiques. Nous commençons par proposer une typologie
dans laquelle les procédés principaux employés sont mis au jour, et les exemples sont décrits et
commentés. La question de savoir ce que les one-liners peuvent dire de l’émergence contextuelle
du sens est ensuite abordée en mettant l’accent sur la construction dynamique du sens. Nous
montrons  également  l’importance  de  la  présence  d’interprétations  fusionnées,  que  l’on  peut
opposer  à  des  analyses  supposant  une  succession  entre  une  interprétation A  et  une  autre
interprétation B annulant l’interprétation A. Nous terminons en rappelant ou montrant que la
dimension comique des one-liners n’est pas soluble dans les questions d’interprétabilité, et pour
qu’un one-liner fonctionne, il faut certes, qu’il soit plutôt compréhensible, mais avant tout, qu’il
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soit drôle, ce qui conduit à une brève discussion des liens que la fonction humoristique des one-
liners peut entretenir avec la question de leur interprétation.
INDEX
Keywords: one-liners, humour studies, semantics, pragmatics, contextual interpretation,
interpretation, humour
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